Prof. Jayanth R. Varma's Financial Markets Blog

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Prof. Jayanth R. Varma's Financial Markets Blog, A Blog on Financial Markets and Their Regulation. This blog is currently suspended.

© Prof. Jayanth R. Varma
jrvarma@iima.ac.in

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Tue, 28 Apr 2020

Indian corporate bonds need a buyer and not a lender

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) announced yesterday that it is setting up a Rs 500 billion Special Liquidity Facility for Mutual Funds (SLF-MF). This is basically a refinance window for banks that lend to mutual funds to help them handle redemption pressures in an environment where corporate bonds are both stressed and illiquid.

I believe that SLF-MF does not solve the real problem at all, because mutual funds by their very design need to liquidate assets to meet redemption. Unlike banks and hedge funds, mutual funds are not designed to use leverage: the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Mutual Fund Regulations state:

The mutual fund shall not borrow except to meet temporary liquidity needs of the mutual funds for the purpose of repurchase, redemption of units or payment of interest or dividend to the unitholders:

Provided that the mutual fund shall not borrow more than 20 per cent of the net asset of the scheme and the duration of such a borrowing shall not exceed a period of six months.

Some mutual funds do talk and act as if the 20% limit allows them to borrow to juice up their returns or to speculate on prices rising in future. But the regulations are clear that this is not the intention, and any mutual fund that borrows for such speculative purposes is actually running a hedge fund in disguise. The proper use of borrowing is to deal with operational timing mismatches where a fund is not able to sell assets and realize the proceeds in time to meet the redemption needs.

Back in 2008, when the RBI launched a facility similar to SLF-MF during the Global Financial Crisis, I explained why mutual funds cannot borrow their way out of redemption trouble:

A mutual fund is very different from a bank. When a bank borrows to repay depositors, there is a capital cushion that can take losses on the assets side. When this capital is gone, the bank also needs to be recapitalized and cannot solve its problems by borrowing from the central bank. A mutual fund does not have any capital separate from the unit holders. This means that the only prudent way for a mutual fund to repay unit holders is by selling assets. If it borrows, then it is exposing remaining unit holders to leveraged losses.

The problem that the mutual fund industry faces today is in many ways worse than in 2008. Until Covid-19, open end debt mutual funds could offer redemption on demand to their investors because there was a liquid market for the bonds that these funds held in their portfolio. Now, the assets have become illiquid and hard to value while the investors are still able to demand instant liquidity. This mismatch can be solved only by some combination of two things: (a) the liquidity of the assets could be improved by a market maker of last resort, or (b) redemption could be restricted. The SLF-MF does neither of these, and merely postpones the problem till the maturity date of the borrowing.

Any financial crisis is ultimately resolved by allocating and absorbing losses. Everything else is a stopgap arrangement that merely postpones the day of reckoning. In times of crisis, there is sometimes merit in such postponement because it buys time for a more orderly loss allocation. But, whenever we kick the can down the road, we must ensure that by doing so we do not make matters worse in terms of making the losses bigger or making the ultimate loss allocation less fair or more difficult. The SLF-MF does not pass this test because it rewards those who redeem and penalizes those that remain in the fund (thereby incentivizing a run on all debt mutual funds):

What then are the solutions to the problems of the mutual fund industry today? I will first outline three solutions that I do not recommend:

My preferred solution is for the mutual fund industry itself to create the buyer of last resort with only limited support from the sovereign. It is guided by the principle that whenever we bail out the financial sector we do so not to help the financiers but to protect the real economy which depends on a well functioning financial sector. In these troubled times, the real economy cannot afford the loss of any source of funding. This is the same principle that guided my proposal earlier this month for a preemptive recapitalization of banks and non bank finance companies.

My proposal is similar to the US Fed’s Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility mentioned above with one critical difference. Instead of the equity for the SPV coming from the government, it should come from the mutual funds themselves. When investors redeem from a mutual fund, and the fund is not able to sell bonds in the market, it can sell the bonds to the SPV at a fair value as determined by the SPV. The mutual fund will be required to contribute a percentage of the fair value as equity stake in the SPV and will receive only the balance in cash. If we follow the US and require 10% equity for the SPV, then a mutual fund selling bonds with a fair value of 100,000 to the SPV will have to contribute 10,000 towards the equity of the SPV. The SPV will use the equity of 10,000 to support 90,000 of borrowing from the RBI which allows it to pay 90,000 as the cash component of the purchase price to the mutual fund. The equity contribution of the mutual fund to the SPV has to come from the investors of the mutual fund. So an investor redeeming 100,000 from the fund would get 90,000 in cash and get the remaining 10,000 in the form of units representing the equity stake in the SPV.

This means that a large part of the credit risk of the bond remains with the redeeming investors as a whole. If the SPV ultimately realizes only 96% of the fair value of all the bonds that it bought, then its equity will come down to 6% from the original 10%. The redeeming unit holder will have got (a) 90,000 in cash and (b) shares in the SPV worth 10,000 originally, but worth only 6,000 when the SPV is wound down. The redeeming investor ends up with 96% of the original fair value of the bonds which matches the 96% ultimate realized value of the bonds. On the other hand, if the SPV realizes 103% of the fair value, then the original equity rises to 13% and the redeeming investor recovers 103,000 (90,000 in cash plus shares in the SPV worth 13,000).

Let me discuss some possible objections to the proposal:

Finally the proposal reflects a realistic evaluation of the current situation:

Posted at 19:09 on Tue, 28 Apr 2020     View/Post Comments (1)     permanent link


Thu, 23 Apr 2020

WTI crude futures in India

India’s commodity derivatives exchange, MCX trades crude oil contracts that mirror the WTI Futures contract traded at CME/NYMEX in the US. When the US contract settled at an unprecedented negative price this week (the seller had to pay the buyer to take their crude away), the Indian contract followed suit. Press reports state that brokers who had bought MCX crude futures suffered a loss of Rs 4.35 billion and have gone to court against the exchange’s decision to settle at a negative price.

I like to think that I have better things to do than take sides in this fight, but I also think that everybody involved in the Indian crude futures market has behaved recklessly. Since around mid-March, it has been clear that WTI crude in the US was experiencing extreme dislocation, and that highly perverse outcomes were likely, though nobody could have predicted the precise outcome. Prudent traders should have stopped trading the MCX crude oil futures in late March, and a prudent derivative exchange should have suspended trading in the contract in early April. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) is currently overburdened with keeping the markets functional during Covid-19, but otherwise, they should have forced MCX to suspend the contract.

Unfortunately the Indian commodity derivatives ecosystem is borrowed lock, stock and barrel from the equity derivative ecosystem. Everybody thinks that a commodity is just another stock price ticker (to trade), another stock price chart (to do technical analysis) and another time series of prices (to compute VaR margins). People tend to forget that commodities are intensely physical, and, unlike stocks, do not come with limited liability. However much we may try to “financialize” and “virtualize” the commodity, its “physicality” never really goes away.

This will therefore be a long post discussing the gory details of crude oil (and WTI crude futures in particular) to explain why I think all parties involved in the MCX crude oil futures behaved recklessly this month.

Economic rationale for Indian crude oil futures

The biggest difference between a futures market and matka gambling is that the futures contract has an economic rationale: it helps economic agents to hedge risks that they are exposed to. Many entities in India are exposed to energy price risk and crude oil futures are useful to hedge that risk. Of course, the crude basket that India imports is closer to Brent crude than to WTI, but then MCX has an MOU with CME that gives them access to CME/NYMEX contracts, and that obviously determined their choice.

So long as WTI crude is highly correlated with Brent (and the Indian crude basket), the choice of underlying does not matter too much. In normal times, the correlation is high and the Indian crude oil futures serves a valuable hedging function. In abnormal times, this correlation can break down and then MCX/NYMEX WTI crude futures would cease to have an economic rationale, and its continued trading would become questionable.

Logistical constraints on WTI crude

Historically, it has been observed that there are occasions when logistical constraints create a big divergence between (a) Brent and the Indian crude basket and (b) WTI. The best known example of this was in 2011 when rising production of shale oil led to a glut of crude at Cushing, Oklahama (the delivery location for the WTI futures contract). At the peak of the dislocation in 2011, WTI crude fell to a discount of around $20 to Brent crude (in the pre-shale era, WTI traded at a premium reflecting its sweetness and lightness).

The critical difference between the two major global crude benchmarks is that Brent is a waterborne crude while WTI is a pipeline-delivered crude. Market forces will move waterborne crude from a region of excess supply to one of excess demand. There are relatively few constraints and frictions in this process of market equilibrium. Pipelines are much more rigid: they have limited capacity and fixed endpoints. A pipeline from point A to B is useless if stuff needs to be moved from A to C or from D to B. Even if the movement required is from A to B, the quantity might exceed the capacity of the pipeline and it would then of limited utility. The sea by contrast has practically unlimited transportation capacity and its directional preferences (winds and ocean currents) can be largely ignored in modern times.

The 2011 experience shows that when logistical constraints arise in landlocked WTI crude, its price diverges not just from Brent, but also from prices in the rest of the world, and indeed even from prices in the rest of the US. In the last decade, benchmarks like LLS and ASCI based on crude prices in the coastal US (Louisiana) have risen in importance. The other observation from 2011 was that refined petroleum products in the US tend to track Brent crude better than they track WTI crude when logistical constraints emerge on WTI. All of this means that WTI starts losing its economic rationale as a hedging instrument for Indian entities in such situations. The behaviour of Indian players in April 2020 needs to be evaluated against this background.

WTI Futures Contract

The WTI futures contract is physically settled: all positions outstanding at the expiry of the contract have to give/take delivery of WTI crude at Cushing, Oklahama which is a major pipeline hub of the US. The delivery procedure at CME/NYMEX reflects the rigidity of pipeline logistics:

Rolling out of WTI futures before expiry

What this means is that the only people who can afford to hold the May futures at expiry would be those who have lined up the pipelines and storage facilities at Cushing, Oklahama. Everybody else should trade out of the contract on or before the last trading session (either by closing the position or by rolling it into the next month contract). In fact, it is very risky to wait till the last trading session to exit the contract. If a buyer is trying to trade out of the contract, and other players know or suspect that the buyer does not have access to a pipeline/storage to take delivery of the crude, the sellers will try to take advantage of his predicament. The buyer’s only hope is to find a seller who does not have the crude to deliver and is equally eager to trade out of the contract. This means that prudent traders who want to square out should do so several days in advance when there is a lot of trading by hedgers and speculators who are not physical players in Cushing.

For example, USO (United States Oil), which is the largest crude oil ETF, typically starts rolling out of a contract two weeks before expiry and completely exits it one week before expiry. In fact, both the exchange and the regulator monitor large positions in the near month contract and encourage traders to reduce positions. They are much more relaxed about positions in the next month or more distant months.

The situation in March/April 2020

Early in March, when crude prices were falling due to Covid-19, Russia and Saudi Arabia held talks on cutting output to stabilize the price. When these talks failed, the Saudis (who are among the lowest cost producers in the world) responded by increasing output to crash prices and remind other oil producers of the perils of not cooperating with Saudi Arabia. In the meantime, demand collapsed as the Covid-19 situation worsened and there was a massive glut of oil worldwide. Prices fell far below what even the Saudis had anticipated, but all players hoped that the demand would bounce back as and when Covid-19 lockdowns were relaxed. The natural response was to store cheap oil so that they could be drawn down when prices rose in future.

By mid/late March, concerns were mounting that storage in Cushing was getting full. On March 19, 2020, Izabella Kaminska wrote in the Financial Times’ Alphaville blog that “in a scenario where there’s literally nowhere to put oil, it’s not inconceivable prices could go negative.” She also explained that some oilfields simply cannot be turned off during a short term glut: “temporary shutdowns pose the risk of them never being able to be revived at the same rates again.” So they would keep pumping crude even at negative prices. On March 27, 2020, Bloomberg reported that “In an obscure corner of the American physical oil market, crude prices have turned negative – producers are actually paying consumers to take away the black stuff.” The price was only 19 cents negative, and the grade of crude was a heavy oil that fetched only around $40 a barrel at the beginning of the year when WTI traded at around $60 (in April, this grade went much more negative). The importance of this Bloomberg report was that it confirmed that negative oil prices were not merely theoretical speculation.

Commodities do not come with limited liability

Many people find it counter intuitive that a commodity can have a negative price. However, the assumption of “free disposal” which is beloved of economics text book writers is not valid in the real world, and there are many examples of negative prices for commodities that are normally quite valuable. Before refrigeration became commercially available, it was quite common for fishermen to pay farmers to collect the day’s unsold fish catch and use it as manure. To understand the plausibility of the negative price, you need only imagine a bunch of fishermen trying to catch a night’s sleep with a boatload of rotting fish just outside their huts. Similarly, I have been told that restaurants often pay pig farmers to collect the waste food at the end of day and feed it to their pigs. On a more sombre note, the Bhopal gas tragedy was an unintended “free disposal” of a hazardous substance. The ultimate negative price of that “free disposal” bankrupted the company.

Please remember that crude oil is also a hazardous substance. Almost everywhere in the world, you would need an explosive licence to stock any significant quantity of it. Anybody who has seen images of oil spills at sea and the damage that it does to sea beaches knows that crude is an ugly and foul thing. Paying somebody to take this stuff from you is not at all unreasonable.

Physical versus Cash Settlement

Some people seem to think that the problems of WTI arise from the fact that it uses physical settlement while the Brent futures uses cash settlement. I have been arguing for more than 15 years that apart from transaction costs, there is no difference between cash settlement and physical settlement. The key difference between Brent and WTI is not in the futures market but in the spot market: one is waterborne and the other is pipeline-delivered. (The Brent physical market is in some ways even more out of reach of ordinary hedgers and speculators than WTI: the typical delivery is a ship load of 600,000 barrels. I described the Brent market in gory detail more than a decade ago and I am not masochistic enough to try and summarize that again.)

What about the theory that the Indian MCX futures is cash settled and therefore should not be subject to the travails of the NYMEX physically settled contract. This reminds me of the story about Medusa in Greek mythology: anybody who looked at Medusa would be turned into stone, but Perseus was able to slay her while looking at her reflection in the mirror. Myth is probably the most charitable word to describe the “Medusa” theory that the NYMEX contract was dangerous, but its reflection in the MCX mirror was safe.

What should Indians have done in early/mid April

First of all, anybody who was actually trying to hedge energy price should have run away from the May WTI futures contract as it was crystal clear that it would no longer provide any meaningful hedge of crude price risk or energy price risk in India.

Second, anybody who was in this contract purely as a speculator needed to understand that in early April, the WTI future was no longer a bet on crude; it was purely and simply a bet on storage space in Cushing. If storage remained available at Cushing, then the May future price could not fall too low. The floor for the price was the expected post Covid-lockdown price (proxied by the July/August futures prices) less the cost of storing crude for a few months. In mid April, this floor might have been estimated at around $15 a barrel. On the other hand, if storage got full, there was no floor on the futures price at all. The price could go negative, and if you did not exit the contract in time, the potential for a hugely negative price was clear as daylight. I would put it this way: when you went long WTI May futures in mid April, you were actually shorting Cushing storage space. Unless you had the discipline, attitude and nerves of a short seller, you should again have run away from this contract.

Third, any prudent broker should have stopped allowing their retail clients to trade this contract purely for risk management reasons. The only clients to whom this contract should have been made available were those with deep pockets and known integrity who could be counted on to pay up when things go wrong. Please remember that when prices can go from positive to negative, even 100% margins are inadequate as the loss exceeds the notional value of the position. This is another way of saying that the long crude position is actually a short storage position and there is no limit to the losses of a short position.

Fourth, if the exchange observed a sizeable open interest in this contract in early/mid April, it should have realized that market participants were ignoring one or more of the above three prudential principles. If market participants are reckless, they pose a risk to the exchange if they are unable to meet their obligations. Also, as mentioned above even 100% margins do not cover the worst case risk in this situation. Faced with this problem, I think the exchange should have done two things:

Posted at 15:40 on Thu, 23 Apr 2020     View/Post Comments (2)     permanent link


Thu, 09 Apr 2020

A new chapter in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code

When India adopted the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2016, it was clear that it was a transitional, stopgap arrangement, and that after the urgent goals of the IBC were met, there would be a need for a more comprehensive and fairer law (I have blogged about this many times, most recently a year ago). Covid-19 has however accelerated this timeline and made it necessary to make urgent modifications in the IBC even before its old goals have been fully achieved.

The pressing goals that led to the enactment of the IBC were two:

  1. A bailout of the Indian financial sector (mainly the banking system) which was (and still is) reeling under a massive burden of bad loans. This goal was accomplished in part by expropriating operational creditors.

  2. Ousting dishonest promoters who had run their companies to the ground but who were allowed in the pre-IBC regime to remain in control of their businesses. This goal was accomplished by handing over control of the company to a committee of creditors who might not know how to run the business, but could at least keep the promoters out.

Covid-19 is leading to a drastically different situation where an even more pressing goal is coming to the fore: rebuilding businesses that have been devastated by the crisis. To accomplish this new overriding goal, we will have to rethink the mechanisms that the IBC created to achieve its original short term goals.

Expropriating operational creditors

As mentioned above, the bailout of the banking system was accomplished by expropriating the non financial (operating) creditors of the company. This expropriation was accomplished by two legal provisions:

It is amazing how such a massive expropriation was achieved without any resistance. The reason is that the financial sector was well organized, and the financial sector regulators as well as the sovereign itself (as the owner of a large part of the banking system) were all batting for them. Operational creditors were unorganized and were not even paying attention. It was only when home buyers realized that they were mere operational creditors of some insolvent real estate developers that they woke up and screamed; the backlash from this segment was so strong that home buyers had to be quickly accommodated by an explanation hastily grafted onto Section 2(8)(f) of the IBC. Other operational creditors continue to remain in the lurch.

Such an expropriation of operational creditors does not happen elsewhere in the world. Right now, for example, we are witnessing the bankruptcy of one of the largest electricity companies in the US, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). The bankruptcy arose because of PG&E’s potentially massive liabilities from certain catastrophic wildlife fires allegedly caused by its equipment. The bankruptcy proceedings of PG&E are being driven by the wildfire victims (who, as tort creditors, would count as operational creditors under IBC), while the financial creditors have been relegated to the backseat.

The expropriation of operational creditors under the IBC will be a disaster in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis in India. The disruption caused by social distancing and subsequent lockdown means that most businesses are under acute stress, and are unable to pay their suppliers or their lenders. To prevent complete economic meltdown, we need companies to continue to sell on credit to their customers while old bills remain unpaid. That is the only way that the going concern value of these businesses can be preserved. The cruel twist of the IBC is that if the suppliers do so, the mega bank will come along and steal the entire going concern value that the operational creditors have created and preserved. There is an urgent need to give trade creditors their due to prevent a massive economic contagion in which firms that fail drag their suppliers down with them, and they drag their suppliers down and so on.

Committee of creditors

Until the IBC came along, Indian businesses were well protected from their lenders by mechanisms like the BIFR. There was consensus that this needed to be changed, and ousting dishonest promoters was an important goal of the IBC. The problem was that the Indian judicial system was and is plagued by excessive delays. It was therefore thought that putting the courts in charge will in effect leave the promoters in charge. So the IBC put a Committee of Creditors in charge of the company during the entire resolution process with a tight timeline to either find a buyer for the whole business or to liquidate it.

Since there was general agreement that many of the defaulting promoters were in fact dishonest, this arrangement made sense. A crooked management would be siphoning off money from the business at every opportunity, and ousting them would actually help preserve value even if the creditors or the resolution professionals that they hire were not very good at running the business.

Covid-19 changes this drastically because businesses will be failing for no fault of theirs. Often the incumbent management would not only be honest but also competent. Throwing them out is a stupid thing to do even for the creditors who are trying to maximize their take. In the extremely challenging post-Covid environment, it would take the most skilled management to rebuild the business. The idea that a bunch of people can do this with no knowledge at all of the industry in question is just laughable. The consequence of handing over the business to the committee of creditors would be a sure prescription for destroying all value. It would ruin not only the employees and other stakeholders but even the lenders themselves who would recover a pittance in a firesale of the assets at a time when other lenders are liquidating similar companies in the same industry.

Some people have suggested suspending the filing of insolvency petitions under the IBC for a few months to prevent such a perverse outcome. They forget that an insolvency petition actually protects the debtor because it carries with it a moratorium on enforcement of debt. Without such a moratorium, most companies will be swamped by enforcement actions by secured creditors. Moreover, without a moratorium, any default will allow counterparties to terminate contracts, and this would be the death knell of the business. What we need is a new chapter in the IBC that allows a Debtor in Possession (DIP) insolvency regime for companies that get into difficulty not due to mismanagement but due to external factors (economy wide or industry wide problems).

In other words, India needs a world class bankruptcy regime in short order. In the rest of the world, we see bankrupt airlines operating flights normally while a bankruptcy court is figuring out how to restructure its debt. Similarly, telecom firms file for bankruptcy while continue to serve their customers without interruption. Steel mills continue to run while the bankruptcy proceedings are going on. The reason this does not happen in India is that we designed a stopgap bankruptcy code which did not envisage any of this. The time has come to remedy this shortcoming.

The way forward

I think we need to quickly add a new chapter to the IBC that allows an insolvency resolution process with the following feature:

Initially, this chapter can be limited to Covid-19 bankruptcies, but over time, it could be extended to other “no-fault” bankruptcies.

Posted at 16:33 on Thu, 09 Apr 2020     View/Post Comments (0)     permanent link


Thu, 02 Apr 2020

A preemptive recapitalization of the Indian financial sector

Under normal conditions, we want financial firms to have enough capital to assure their survival. In the aftermath of Covid-19, we would want much more. We would want financial firms that are ready to lend to companies that seek to rebuild their businesses, and to individuals trying to rebuild their lives. We would not want financial firms that bunker down and try to conserve their capital because they are scared about their own survival.

If that is the goal, then India’s financial sector will need a large capital infusion for two reasons:

  1. At least since the ILFS meltdown, the financial sector has been under stress, and many firms, particularly, Non Bank Finance Companies (NBFCs) are vulnerable.

  2. The economic costs of the Covid-19 lockdown (and social distancing) is likely to lead to a rise in both corporate and retail loan defaults. Initial indications from China (which is just coming out of its lockdown) are suggestive of a 5% default rate in credit card loans, and the worst is probably yet to come. A similar phenomenon can be expected in retail loan portfolios worldwide, and India is unlikely to be an exception.

Needless to say, the sovereign is possibly the only source of capital for most NBFCs in the current environment. The government will have to inject capital across the board to NBFCs somewhat like the US did to the banks in 2008 under the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program). Indeed the breadth of the capital injection will have to be even broader because the goal is not to ensure that the NBFC survives, but that it has adequate capital to lend freely.

It is also necessary to ensure that this does not become a bailout of the existing shareholders of weak institutions. The broad outlines of such a scheme could be as follows.

The first step would be to determine the amount of capital injection. Starting with the December 2019 balance sheet, the new capital injection could be designed to bring the December 2019 capital adequacy ratio to a level of say 20% of risk weighted assets. This is designed to ensure that even large post Covid-19 loan losses would leave the NBFC with a capital adequacy of say 15% which would be adequate to support a significant expansion of the loan book.

Since an equity valuation is probably impossible under the current conditions, the government’s injection could take the form of redeemable convertible preference shares. The conversion terms would be set such that if conversion happens, the preference shareholder would end up with say 99% of the post conversion capital. In other words, the old shareholders would be diluted out of existence. This would effectively result in the outright nationalization of the NBFC. (Crisis period nationalizations are of course intended to be temporary with the eventual goal of sale, flotation or liquidation.)

But the NBFC could avoid this outcome by redeeming the preference shares two or three years down the line (when the economy and the markets have normalized). A pre-condition for such redemption would be an acceptable post redemption capital adequacy ratio. Hence in most cases, redemption would have to be financed by raising new equity capital at market prices. To incentivize an early redemption, the interest rate on the preference shares could be set at a spread of say 10% (1000 basis points) above the repo rate from the second year onward. The interest rate in the first year could approximate a modest spread over the NBFC’s estimated December 2019 borrowing cost.

The proposed instrument would clearly provide economic capital, but under current regulatory norms, it may not count as Tier 1 capital. If necessary, this gap between regulatory and economic capital could be bridged by regulatory forbearance.

I have focused on NBFCs because that is where the stress is most evident, but it is possible that some weak private sector banks would need the same treatment. The NPA crisis in the Indian banking system and the ILFS disaster have left India’s financial sector too weak to support the credit needs of the Indian economy, and the Covid-19 promises to make things a lot worse. India can ill afford a contraction of credit in these critical times, and decisive action is needed to preserve as much of the financial sector as possible.

Posted at 21:08 on Thu, 02 Apr 2020     View/Post Comments (0)     permanent link